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A. Cases 
The subsequent two case studies shall help to illustrate the legal questions, which arise 
from the topic. The first (real) case is addressing the issue of surrogacy, while the second 
(hypothetical) one concerns the issue of post-mortem reproduction: 
 
Case 11 
A male same-sex couple (A and B, both of German nationality) wants to have a child. 
Therefore, A travels to India, acquires an egg cell which is then fertilized with his sperm and 
transferred to the uterus of an Indian, not married surrogate mother (C). The surrogate mother 
previously had agreed to waive all mother’s rights. After C gave birth to the child, A 
acknowledges his paternity. 
1. Is this kind of surrogacy permissible in Germany? 
2. Who are the child´s legal parents under German law? 
3. How would this case have to be judged if the surrogate mother was married and her 
national law (in that case: of the Ukraine) allows to agree on the legal paternity of two 
persons other than hers and of her husband2? 
 
Case 2 
A (woman) and B (husband) are married and want to have a common baby. Because B 
is severely ill, some of his sperm cells are cryopreserved. B dies. After his death, A wants one 
of her ovules to be fertilized with the cryopreserved sperm cells of her deceased husband. 
1. Is this method of reproduction permissible under German law? 
                                               
1 Case decided by the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Düsseldorf, ruling of 26 April 2014, Ref. 
no. I-3 Wx 211/12, BeckRS 2014, 07831. 
2 Case decided by the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) of Berlin, ruling of 5 September 2012, Ref. no. 
23 L 283.12, BeckRS 2012, 56424. 
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2. Would the case´s judgment be different if B died only after the egg cell had been fertilized, 
but not yet transferred? 
 
B. Legal situation in Germany 
I. Surrogacy 
1. Definitions of surrogacy 
Inter alia, the term “surrogate mother” (“Ersatzmutter”) is defined by section 13a of 
the Adoption Placement Act (“Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz”)3. According to this provision, a 
surrogate mother is a “woman who is prepared to carry out an agreement on either (1) 
undergoing in-vitro or natural fertilization or (2) having an embryo of another woman 
transferred to her and to give away the child to third persons in order for them to acknowledge 
paternity of the child or to permanently take in the child otherwise”. 
Besides, section 1 para. 1 no. 7 of the Embryo Protection Act 
(Embryonenschutzgesetz)4 – hereinafter referred to as EPA – contains a shorter, but 
comparable definition of the term “surrogate mother” (“Leihmutter”). Pursuant to this section, 
a surrogate mother is a “woman who is prepared to give up her child permanently after birth”. 
In contrast, the “intended mother” (“Wunschmutter”) is the woman who is intended to 
become the legal mother of the child carried out by the surrogate mother. She and her partner 
represent the “intended parents”. Nevertheless, the law does not legally define or use these 
formulations. 
 
2. Various forms of surrogacy 
There are various ways to put a surrogacy into effect: 
Firstly, an ovule of the surrogate mother can be fertilized with the sperm of the 
partner/husband of the intended mother. This fertilization process can take place either in 
vitro or in vivo (via assisted insemination) or even through sexual intercourse between the 
surrogate mother and the sperm donor. If these methods lead to a fertilization, the surrogate 
mother will carry out the child. In this scenario, the child is genetically related only to the 
father, but not to its intended mother. 
Secondly, an ovule of the intended mother can be fertilized with the sperm of her 
partner/husband. This fertilized egg is then transferred to the surrogate mother who carries out 
                                               
3 Federal Law Gazette 2002-I, p. 354 et seq. 
4 Federal Law Gazette 1990-I, p. 2746 et seq. 
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the child. Unlike the first constellation, in this scenario the child is genetically related to both 
intended parents. 
Thirdly, it is possible that none of the three persons involved – the surrogate mother, 
the intended mother and the intended father – are genetically related to the prospective child. 
This is the case when other persons than the surrogate mother or the intended parents donate 
both, ovule and sperm. In this alternative, the donated egg cell normally is fertilized in vitro 
with the donated sperm, which leads to the scenario of an embryo donation. 
These constellations of surrogacy have to be distinguished from “regular” forms of 
adoption. The distinction between surrogacy and adoption depends on the fact whether the 
woman who is giving birth to the child has – at the moment of fertilization – agreed or 
planned to give the new born child away. If there was no such intention at the time of 
procreation and the mother or the parents develop this wish only after this decisive moment, 
the adoption rules rather than the rules regarding surrogacy will apply. However, in practice it 
might be difficult to distinguish these scenarios and in particular to proof the real intentions of 
the persons involved. 
 
3. Legal framework 
a) Prohibition of surrogacy under German law 
In Germany, provisions regarding assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are laid 
down in the EPA. This act contains several criminal provisions, which prohibit certain 
reproductive techniques. The act´s leading principle with respect to ART is set out by section 
1 para. 1 EPA. According to this provision, ovules have to be extracted from, and, after 
fertilization, retransferred to the woman who wants get pregnant. Therefore, “(a)nyone will be 
punished with up to three years imprisonment or a fine, who (1) transfers into a woman an 
unfertilized egg cell another woman, (2) attempts to fertilize artificially an egg cell for any 
purpose other than bringing about a pregnancy of the woman from whom the egg cell 
originated, (…) or (7) attempts to carry out an artificial fertilization of a woman who is 
prepared to give up her child permanently after birth (surrogate mother) or to transfer a human 
embryo into her”. Thus, the above described forms of surrogacy5 are not only prohibited by 
law, but are also considered to be a criminal offense6. They all fall within the scope of the 
prohibition of section 1 para. 1 no. 7 EPA, but may, depending on the specific circumstances, 
also be prohibited by section 1 para. 1 no. 1 or no. 2 EPA. Nevertheless, the woman from 
                                               
5 See supra 2. 
6 Which delivers the answer to question 1 of case 1 (see supra A.). 
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whom the donated egg cell or embryo originated, and likewise the woman into whom this 
ovule or embryo is transferred, are not subject to punishment7. The same applies to the 
surrogate mother and likewise to the person who wishes to take long-term care of the child. 
Hence, the penal provisions are aimed primarily against the physician conducting such 
actions8. 
Complementary, civil law contracts regarding such prohibited surrogacy techniques 
are void, because they violate a statutory prohibition and are contrary to public policy9. 
According to the German legislator, it is the aim of this statutory prohibition to 
prevent a “split motherhood”, i.e. – depending on the respective situation – the separation of 
the genetic mother, the mother who carries out the child (= “biological mother”) and the 
intended mother. In the legislator´s opinion, the special relationship between the unborn child 
and its biological mother forbids the takeover of pregnancies as a kind of service. Therefore, 
an agreement on surrogacy is considered as being detrimental to the children since it 
disregards the importance of the mother's womb for the development of the child´s 
personality and the substantial contribution of a biological and psychological relationship 
between the pregnant woman and the child. Furthermore, the prohibition shall ensure the 
protection of women and children against health threats and psychological risks after birth. In 
particular, the children shall be granted the possibility of finding their identity without 
disturbance and of growing up in secure family relationships. Besides, the women shall be 
prevented from dehumanizing conflicts, which may result from a takeover of pregnancies as a 
service and possible disputes with respect to the delivery of the child. Furthermore, conflicts 
resulting of a surrogate motherhood could eventually occur if after the birth of a disabled 
child the “ordering parents” do not want to take care of it, if the surrogate mother feels unable 
to separate from the child or even the question of an abortion arises during pregnancy10. 
 
b) Prohibition of the agency of surrogate mothers 
Provisions outlawing the agency of surrogate mothers support the legal prohibition of 
surrogacy. Pursuant to section 13c of the Adoption Placement Act11, it is prohibited and a 
criminal offense to broker surrogate mothers. Furthermore, according to section 14b para. 1 
                                               
7 Section 1 para. 3 EPA. 
8 This equally follows from the fact that according to sections 9 and 11 EPA anyone who, without being a 
physician, carries out an artificial fertilization will be punished with up to one year imprisonment or a fine. 
9 Cf. Local Court (Amtsgericht) of Hamm, ruling of 22 February 2011, Ref. no. XVI 192/08, BeckRS 2011, 
25140. See also section 134 of the German Civil Code (CC) that stipulates: “A legal transaction that violates a 
statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different conclusion”. According to section 138 para. 1 
CC, a “legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void”, too. 
10 Cf. German Bundestag, printed papers no. 11/4154 p. 6 et seq. and no. 11/5460, p. 6 and 9. 
11 See supra footnote 3. 
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and 2 punishable is who operates a surrogate agency or receives or accepts pecuniary benefits 
for providing surrogate mothers. Once again, the surrogate mother and the intended parents 
are exempted from punishment12. 
Due to these provisions, agency contracts on surrogacy are widely – but not 
unanimously – considered to be void, because of their violation of statutory prohibitions and 
public policy13. If the agency contract has been concluded under the regime of foreign law, 
which does not prohibit surrogacy, such agency contracts might nonetheless be considered 
void, based on the “ordre public”-exception14 of the German private international law15. 
 
c) Family and inheritance law 
aa) Maternity 
In order to ensure the Roman law principle “mater semper certa est”, the German 
legislator introduced section 1591 into the Civil Code in 1998. This provision stipulates that 
“(t)he mother of a child is the woman who gave birth to it”. It supplements the previously 
enacted provisions of the EPA and the Adoption Placement Act, which – as could be 
demonstrated above – disapprove surrogacy in several ways. Therefore, the provision intends 
to prevent a circumvention of the prohibition of surrogacy via private law agreements. 
Furthermore, the legislator wanted to ensure legal certainty regarding the question of 
motherhood by preventing a “split maternity”. Despite the prohibition of surrogacy and its 
agency, it was important to the legislator to clarify the civil law question of motherhood with 
regard to cases, where surrogacy was realized either abroad or illegally within Germany. 
Whilst deciding on the maternity of the genetic or the biological mother, the legislator 
emphasized the fact that only the laboring woman had a physical and psychosocial 
relationship to the child during pregnancy as well as during and immediately after birth16. 
In addition, unlike paternity, the German law does not provide the possibility to 
contest maternity17. This excludes motherhood of another woman even if the child is 
genetically descended from her. Thus, under German law the surrogate mother is always 
                                               
12 Section 14b para. 3 Adoption Placement Act. 
13 See supra footnote 9. 
14 According to art. 6 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Federal Law Gazette 1994-I, p. 2494 et seq.), a 
provision of the law of another country shall not be applied in Germany where its application would lead to a 
result which is manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law. In particular, 
inapplicability ensues, if its application would be incompatible with fundamental rights. 
15 In its latest Ruling, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) denies an across-the-board 
application of the “ordre public”-exception when judging surrogacy cases, cf. ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. 
no. XII ZB 463/13, recital. 
16 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, recital 37. 
17 Cf. German Bundestag, printed papers no. 13/4899, p. 51 et seq., 82. 
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considered to be the legal mother of the child, notwithstanding its genetic relationship to her 
or the intended parents. Nevertheless, an acquired legal maternity through adoption of the 
born child by another woman remains possible provided that the conditions of an adoption are 
fulfilled18. 
 
bb) Paternity 
According to section 1592 CC, “father of a child is the man (1) who is married to the 
mother of the child at the date of birth, (2) who has acknowledged paternity or (3) whose 
paternity has been judicially established under section 1600d or section 182 para. 1 of the Act 
on the Procedure in Family Matters and in Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction”. Only the 
last alternative requires a determination of the genetic lineage. 
As a result, section 1592 CC follows the principle that the father of a child is the man 
who is married to the woman giving birth to the child. However, if the mother is not married 
or paternity has successfully been contested, the genetic father can acknowledge paternity (or 
his paternity can be judicially determined) and thus become the legal father. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that pursuant to section 1600 para. 2 CC the 
genetic father may contest the paternity of the legal father only if there is no social and family 
relationship between the child and its legal father nor was there such a relationship at the date 
of his death. 
Altogether, this legal situation allows the intended (heterologous) parents to become 
legal parents in the following way: If the intended father is, due to a sperm donation, also the 
genetic father of the child, he has to acknowledge paternity (if necessary, after contestation) 
and thus become its legal father. Afterwards, the intended mother has to adopt the child, 
notwithstanding the fact of whether she is or is not genetically related to the child19. 
This possibility does not only exist for heterologous couples. According to section 9 
para. 7 of the Life Partnership Act (Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz)20, stipulating that a life 
partner may adopt the child of his life partner, it may be exercised also by same-sex couples. 
In Germany, this procedure of adoption is called “stepchild adoption”. Hence, in the 
                                               
18 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, recital 35; Claudia Mayer, 
Ordre public und Anerkennung der rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen, RabelsZ 
78 (2014), 551 (555 ff.); Nina Dethloff, Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder, JZ 2014, 922 (923 f.); Tobias 
Helms, Leihmutterschaft - ein rechtsvergleichender Überblick, StAZ 2013, 114; Alexander Diel, 
Leihmutterschaft und Reproduktionstourismus, Wolfgang Metzner Verlag Frankfurt am Main 2013, p. 137. 
19 Cf. sections 1741 para. 1 sentence 2 and 1747. See also Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, ruling of 7 
February 2012, Ref. no. 8 W 46/12, NJW-RR 2012, 389 (390). Against this reasoning Local Court (Amtsgericht) 
of Hamm, ruling of 22 February 2011, Ref. no. XVI 192/08, BeckRS 2011, 25140. 
20 Federal Law Gazette 2001-I, p. 266 et seq. 
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introductory case21, the homosexual A obtains legal paternity without even being obliged to 
contest paternity of another father because the surrogate mother C was not married at the time 
of delivery. Consequently, in this scenario the intended is also the genetic and the legal 
father22. C is the biological and legal mother, but can agree to adoption. This paves the way 
for B, the homosexual partner of A, to adopt the child pursuant to section 9 para. 7 of the Life 
Partnership Act (“stepchild adoption”) and thereby to become its second legal parent23. 
Nevertheless, the situation may be different in the scenario of the third question of 
case 124. Here, the persons involved (intended parents, surrogate mother and her husband) 
lawfully agreed on the question of legal parenthood. If pursuant to private international law, 
the legal order of the surrogate mother’s country – in this case: the Ukraine – is applicable, 
the intended parents will become legal parents by agreement as long as the ordre public-
clauses of the German law do not contravene this result. Whether a foreign (court) decision, 
establishing legal parenthood based on a surrogacy agreement, has to be recognized in 
Germany or whether such an agreement is incompatible with the German ordre public is 
currently discussed controversially. Parts of the case law and the legal literature deny this 
question.25 In contrast, a different opinion principally acknowledges the compatibility of such 
an agreement with the German ordre public26. 
The Federal Court of Justice has not yet decided on this dispute. Nevertheless, in its 
latest landmark decision regarding surrogacy, it has recognized that in cases in which an 
intended parent is genetically related to the child born by a surrogate mother at least the 
                                               
21 See supra A. (case 1, question 2). 
22 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, recital 31. 
23 Nota bene: Till 2013, section 9 para. 7 of the Life Partnership Act denied the possibility of the adoption of an 
adopted child of the registered life partner by the other spouse (so-called “successive adoption”), whereas the 
possibility of adoption of an adopted child of the (heterologous) spouse and the possibility of the adoption of a 
biological child of the registered life partner (“stepchild adoption”) were opened. According to a recent decision 
of the Federal Constitutional Court (ruling of 19 February 2013, Ref. no. 1 BvL 1/11 et al.), this differentiation 
violates the right to equal treatment (art. 3 para 1 of the German Basic Law). Therefore, the so-called “successive 
adoption” is meanwhile also permissible under section 9 para. 7 of the Life Partnership Act. 
24 Once again, see supra A. 
25 Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) of Berlin, ruling of 5 September 2012, Ref. no. 23 L 283/12, 
FamRZ 2013, 738; Christoph Benicke, Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen der Leihmutterschaft, StAZ 2013, 101 (110 
ff.); Normann Witzleb, in: Normann Witzleb/Reinhard Ellger/Peter Mankowski/Hanno Merkt/Oliver Remien 
(eds.), Festschrift für Dieter Martiny zum 70. Geburtstag, Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 2014, p. 203 (234) for same-
sex intended parents; Martin Engel, Internationale Leihmutterschaft und Kindeswohl, ZEuP 2014, 538 (558). 
26 Local Court (Amtsgericht) of Neuss, ruling of 14 Mai 2013, Ref. no. 45 F 74/13, FamRZ 2014, 1127; Local 
Court (Amtsgericht) of Friedberg, ruling of 1 March 2013, Ref. no. 700 F 1142/12, FamRZ 2013, 1994; Fritz 
Sturm, in: Jürgen F. Baur/Otto Sandrock/Boris Scholtka/Amos Sapira (eds.), Festschrift für Gunther Kühne zum 
70. Geburtstag, Recht und Wirtschaft Frankfurt am Main 2009, p. 919 (931 f.); Nina Dethloff, Leihmütter, 
Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder, JZ 2014, 922 (926); Claudia Mayer, Ordre public und Anerkennung der 
rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen, RabelsZ 78 (2014), 551 (570 ff.); Alexander 
Diel, Leihmutterschaft und Reproduktionstourismus, Wolfgang Metzner Verlag Frankfurt am Main 2013, p. 169 
ff.; im Ergebnis ebenfalls Bettina Heiderhoff, Rechtliche Abstammung im Ausland geborener Leihmütter, NJW 
2014, 2673 (2674). 
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acknowledgment of a foreign decision attributing parenthood to the intended parents does not 
violate the German ordre public and there may be recognized in Germany27. The fact that a 
foreign decision assigns parenthood not to a heterologous, but to a same-sex couple does also 
not contradict this (procedural) principle28. With a detailed and convincing argumentation, the 
Federal Court of Justice bases this result especially on the well-being of the child29. 
 
cc) Maintenance obligations 
Maintenance obligations depend on legal parentage. Thus, the genetic father is not 
facing any maintenance obligations as long as another man is considered to be the legal 
father. If the child, with the mutual consent of this man and the woman who is giving birth to 
it, was conceived with the help of a sperm donation from a third person (genetic father), the 
contestation of paternity by the legal father or the mother is even excluded30. 
By contrast, the “biological mother”, i.e. the woman who gave birth to the child, is 
always considered as legal mother without the opportunity to contest her maternity. Hence, 
she is obliged to pay maintenance until the intended mother or any other person adopts the 
child. Furthermore, the child´s right to maintenance may not be waived for the future31, e.g. 
by an agreement between the surrogate mother and the intended parents. 
Furthermore, a person who paid maintenance without legal obligation, like – if 
applicable – the husband of the surrogate mother who has no genetic relationship with the 
child, may sue for compensation32. However, this recourse claim normally is excluded for the 
period preceding the successful contestation of paternity33. 
 
dd) Inheritance law 
In Germany, the inheritance law is governed by sections 1922 et seq. CC. Just as the 
maintenance law, the provisions regarding inheritance are characterized by a correlation with 
the parentage law. Therefore, the child´s title of inheritance depends on a legal relationship 
(legal parentage) to the deceased person. Nevertheless, a contestation of paternity stays 
                                               
27 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, recital 34 and 53. However, 
it has one again to be emphasised that in this decision the court is only referring to a procedural notion of ordre 
public and not to a substantive one. 
28 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, recital 43 with reference to 
the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the admissibility of a so-called “successive adoption” 
(vide supra footnote 23). 
29 Cf. Federal Court of Justice, ruling of 10 December 2014, Ref. no. XII ZB 463/13, Recital 44 et seq. 
30 Cf. section 1600 para. 5 CC. 
31 Cf. section 1614 para. 1 CC. 
32 Cf. section 1607 para. 3 sentence 2 CC. 
33 Cf. section 1600d para. 4 and section 1594 para. 1 CC. 
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possible even after the death of the legal father, as long as there was no social and family 
relationship between the latter and the child at the date of his death34. 
 
d) German Citizenship Law 
Questions regarding German citizenship are laid down in the Citizenship Act 
(Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) and in the Passport Act (Passgesetz)35. According to sections 1, 
3 and 4 of the former act, German Citizenship may be acquired by birth if at least one of the 
parents possesses the German nationality. In this context, problems may arise when the 
surrogate mother – as often – does not possess the German citizenship and is at the same time 
married to a Non-German husband. In this case, both are considered as legal parents of the 
child with the consequence that the child cannot acquire the German citizenship by birth. 
According to the administrative court of Berlin this is even the case when – like in the 
Ukraine – the child does not acquire the nationality of its surrogate mother and her husband 
but of the intended parents. Such a provision shall be in contradiction to the ordre public of 
the German law and therefore not be applicable36. In this situation, the child may acquire the 
German citizenship only through adoption by the intended German parents37. In contrast, if 
the Non-German surrogate mother is not married and the child has been conceived via a 
sperm donation by the intended German father, the latter can acknowledge paternity which 
will then result in a German citizenship of the child. 
 
II. Post-mortem reproduction 
1. Prohibition of post-mortem reproduction 
According to section 4 para. 1 no. 3 EPA, “(a)nyone will be punished with up to three 
years imprisonment or a fine, who (…) knowingly fertilizes artificially an egg cell with the 
sperm of a man after his death”. Consequently, in Germany post-mortem fertilizations with 
the sperm of a deceased man are prohibited38. This prohibition primarily is addressed to the 
physician undertaking the assisted reproduction, whereas the woman to whom the fertilized 
egg cell is transferred will not be punished39. 
                                               
34 Cf. section 1600 para. 2 CC and supra bb). 
35 Federal Law Gazette 1986-I, p. 537 et seq. If the child does not possess the German citizenship, it will not 
receive a passport, which is necessary to travel to Germany with its intended parents. 
36 Ruling of 5 September 2012, Ref. no. 23 L 283.12, BeckRS 2012, 56424. However, the relationship between 
this judgment and the landmark decision of the Federal Court of Justice (see supra footnote 27) remains unclear. 
37 See Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, ruling of 7 February 2012, Ref. no. 8 W 46/12, FamRZ 2012, 1740. 
38 Which delivers the answer to case 2, question 1 (see supra A.). 
39 Cf. section 4 para. 2 EPA. 
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In contrast, the post-mortem fertilization of a cryopreserved egg cell originating from 
a deceased woman is not prohibited by section 4 para. 1 no. 3 EPA but by section 1 para. 1 
no. 2 EPA. It stipulates that anyone shall be punished with up to three years imprisonment or 
a fine, who attempts to fertilize artificially an egg cell for any purpose other than bringing 
about a pregnancy of the woman from whom the egg cell originated. Nevertheless, if a man 
whose sperms were used to inseminate an ovule dies after the egg cell has been fertilized, the 
prohibition of section 4 para. 1 no. 3 EPA does not apply40. Furthermore, the Guidelines of 
the German Medical Association (Bundesärztekammer) regarding the performance of assisted 
reproduction stipulate that cryopreserved 2-pronucleus cells – which, due to a lack of fusion 
of the respective maternal and paternal nuclei, do not yet have the status of a legally protected 
embryo41 – have to be destroyed in case of death of one of the partners seeking for medical 
reproductive assistance42. 
 
2. Legislative reasoning 
The legislative records only include a short motivation of this prohibition. Firstly, the 
provision shall aim at preventing an unauthorized fertilization of ovules without the consent 
of the (deceased) sperm donor. Therefore, section. 4 para. 1 EPA primarily wants to protect 
the right to self-determination of the (deceased) male partner. However, the provision goes 
beyond this aim by also banning a post-mortem fertilization, if the deceased man has 
approved this procedure during lifetime. The legislative records try to justify this 
comprehensive legal ban with the argument that “the provision would also like to counteract 
risks for the development of the child, which at least cannot be ruled out, if it is procreated in 
a manner not corresponding to the will of the involved parties”43. This rather vague 
explanation becomes somewhat more understandable by the legislator´s additional note that 
otherwise the formation of close personal relations with the child could be hindered. Thus, 
again, the legislator seems to be worried about the well-being of the prospective child, which 
could be at risk if it has from the outset to grow up without a genetic father and therefore has 
no possibility to learn from whom it originated. Besides, some authors in legal literature 
                                               
40 See Higher Regional Court of Rostock, ruling of 7 May 2010, Ref. no. 7 U 67/09, BeckRS 2010, 12238 = 
MedR 2010, 874. See also case 2, question 1 (supra A.). 
41 Cf. section 8 para. 1 EPA which reads as follows: “For the purpose of this Act, an embryo already means the 
human egg cell, fertilized and capable of developing, from the time of fusion of the nuclei, and further, each 
totipotent cell removed from an embryo that is assumed to be able to divide and to develop into an individual 
under the appropriate conditions for that”. 
42 See commentary on 5.2 (cryopreservation), Guidelines of the German Medical Association on assisted 
reproduction, see: http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/AssRepro.pdf 
43 Cf. German Bundestag, printed papers no. 11/5460, p. 10. Nevertheless, it remains unclear who these involved 
parties are – only the prospective parents or also the prospective child. 
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invoke psychological problems if the child has to find out that its biological father was 
already deceased at the time of assisted fertilization. A minority opinion even suggests the 
violation of human dignity if the ART veers away too much from the natural way of 
fertilization and birth. Furthermore, some discussants argue that in the case of post-mortem 
reproduction the donor of the sperm cells cannot, due to his previous death, become the legal 
father of the child, which does not only lead to a loss of a psychological parent in the child´s 
life but also to a loss of the child´s maintenance rights44. 
 
C. Recent discussion in Germany 
I. Surrogacy 
In Germany, the legal prohibition of surrogacy is increasingly challenged. As the ban 
is justified with the child´s well-being, the question arises why sperm donation, which also 
leads to a split parenthood, has always been permissible under German law. Against this 
background, the legalization of egg donation is meanwhile strongly advocated. Besides, 
experiences from other countries, where surrogacy has been practiced for a longer period 
seem not to confirm significantly increased psychological or other risks for the well-being of 
the child45. 
Nevertheless, it will not be sufficient simply to allow surrogacy. Rather, it requires a 
statutory limit. Especially, the legislator has to stipulate the conditions of offering surrogacy 
services, the rights of the surrogate mother with regard to her pregnancy and the child after its 
birth or her financial compensation. Besides, the legislator has to define the obligations of the 
intended parents with regard to the surrogate mother and the delivered child. In addition, 
questions of parenthood and maintenance obligations should to be addressed by such a new 
legislation. 
Against this background, a group of professors from the universities of Augsburg and 
Munich has presented a proposal for a new law on reproductive medicine in Germany just 
recently. This draft also includes a provision regarding surrogacy, which could serve as a 
basis for the discussion of the legal situation in Germany. This provision states as follows: 
 
 
                                               
44 For further details regarding the reasoning with respect to the prohibition of post-mortem fertilization see 
Jochen Taupitz, in: Hans-Ludwig Günther/Jochen Taupitz/Peter Kaiser (eds.), Embryonenschutzgesetz, 2. ed. 
2014, section 4 recital 26 et seq. Ulrich Gassner/Jens Kersten/Matthias Krüger/Josef Franz Lindner/Henning 
Rosenau/Ulrich Schroth, Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, Augsburg-Münchner-Entwurf, Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 
2013, p. 38. 
45 Cf. Ralf Müller-Terpitz, in: Andreas Spickhoff (ed.), Medizinrecht, 2. ed., C. H. Beck Munich 2014, § 1 
ESchG recital 7 and 21 with further references. 
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“Section 8 Surrogacy’’ 
(1) Surrogacy may be provided only if the notarized proof of unconditional and irrevocable 
acceptance of the child by a third party has been given and a notary public previously has 
informed the parties about the civil, especially family and inheritance law consequences of 
surrogacy (…). 
(2) Medically assisted reproduction using surrogacy may be performed only in an approved 
center. 
(3) A surrogate motherhood shall not be subject to a paid legal transaction. An expense 
allowance as well as a fee for medically assisted reproduction are possible”46. 
 
II. Post mortem reproduction 
The prohibition of post mortem fertilization is increasingly questioned, as well. The 
father´s right to self-determination can be easily realized through the necessity of an explicit 
consent regarding this procedure of reproduction during his lifetime. This necessity will 
automatically limit the number of possible cases. In addition, the father of a child can also 
decease after its conception, but before its birth. In this case too, the child has to grow up 
without a paternal caregiver or without a person, against which it could claim maintenance 
obligations. Therefore, the legislator should lift the blanket ban of section 4 para. 1 EPA and 
stipulate conditions under which a post mortem fertilization shall be permitted. In particular, 
the legislator has to define time limits, which are to be observed by the widow and the 
fertilization center47. 
 
                                               
46 Ulrich Gassner/Jens Kersten/Matthias Krüger/Josef Franz Lindner/Henning Rosenau/Ulrich Schroth, 
Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, Augsburg-Münchner-Entwurf, Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 2013, p. 61. 
47 Cf. Ulrich Gassner/Jens Kersten/Matthias Krüger/Josef Franz Lindner/Henning Rosenau/Ulrich Schroth, 
Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, Augsburg-Münchner-Entwurf, Mohr Siebeck Tübingen 2013, p. 38; Jochen 
Taupitz, in: Hans-Ludwig Günther/Jochen Taupitz/Peter Kaiser (eds.), Embryonenschutzgesetz, 2. ed., Stuttgart 
2014, section 4 recital 26 et seq. 
